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Abstract This paper seeks to understand why climate infor-
mation is produced differently from country to country. To do
this, we critically examined and compared the social and sci-
entific values that shaped the production of three national
climate scenarios in the Netherlands, Switzerland and the
UK. A comparative analysis of documentary materials and
expert interviews linked to the climate scenarios was per-
formed. Our findings reveal a new typology of use-inspired
research in climate science for decision-making: (i) innova-
tors, where the advancement of science is the main objective;
(ii) consolidators, where knowledge exchanges and networks
are prioritised; and (iii) collaborators, where the needs of users
are put first and foremost. These different values over what
constitutes ‘good’ science for decision-making are mirrored in
the way users were involved in the production process: (i)
elicitation, where scientists have privileged decision-making
power; (ii) representation, where multiple organisations medi-
ate on behalf of individual users; and (iii) participation, where
a multitude of users interact with scientists in an equal part-
nership. These differences help explain why climate
knowledge gains its credibility and legitimacy differently even
when the information itself might not be judged as salient and
usable. If the push to deliberately co-produce climate knowl-
edge is not sensitive to the national civic epistemology at play
in each country, scientist–user interactions may fail to deliver
more ‘usable’ climate information.
Keywords Climate scenarios . Adaptation .
Decision-making . Co-production . Civic epistemology
Introduction
Extreme weather events cause damage, disruption and loss
of life across the world. As the present climate changes,
extreme events like floods and heatwaves are likely to be-
come more frequent and intense (IPCC 2014). To adapt,
society needs to better understand how the climate might
change in the future, together with the associated risks. By
showing how the temperature may change or rainfall pat-
terns shift over the next century, climate information can
help inform adaptation planning and decision-making.
National climate scenarios have taken up this challenge.
They paint a picture of how the future climate may change
for a country, on the basis of a set of greenhouse emission
pathways. As Hulme and Dessai (2008) explain, scenarios
have a long and varied history, originating in military strat-
egy and planning in the 1950s and expanded by the energy
industry in the 1970s before becoming a common tool for
decision-making in government.1 National climate scenar-
ios, as a result, have become influential decision support
tools for adaptation in the UK (Jenkins et al. 2009),
1 For clarity purposes, we use ‘climate scenarios’ to encompass ‘climate
change scenarios’, ‘national climate assessments’ and ‘climate change
projections’.
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Switzerland (CH2011 2011), Germany (DWD 2012),
South Africa (DEA 2013), Ireland (Gleeson et al. 2013),
the Netherlands (KNMI 2014a), the USA (Melillo et al.
2014) and Australia (CSIRO and Bureau of Meteorology
2015), amongst others.
Yet, climate information often remains unused because it is
seen to be too complex, not sufficiently relevant or unusable.
To narrow this ‘usability gap’ (Lemos et al. 2012), scholars
have focused their attention on how to bring scientists and
users together to deliberately co-produce climate information
(Meadow et al. 2015; Dilling and Lemos 2011). If scientists
understand what climate information is needed and, in turn,
users understand what scientists can provide, delivering rele-
vant and usable science could face less barriers; it is argued
(Lemos and Rood 2010). How this should be done is unclear,
however. Tangney and Howes (2016) have shown that the
credibility, legitimacy and saliency of climate information
are viewed differently from one country to the next.
Different political cultures and scientific values affect how
climate information is produced and the extent to which users
are involved (Hanger et al. 2013; Beck 2012; Jasanoff 2005;
Shackley 2001). This is because, in part, the way science is
publicly acknowledged, circulated and legitimised in each
country reflects its own ‘civic epistemology’ (Jasanoff
2005). That is the process by which countries ‘assess the ra-
tionality and robustness of claims that seek to order their lives’
(ibid). While greater scientist–user interactions should be en-
couraged, those advocating co-production need to be aware of
the existing social and political cultures they are intervening
in. If not handled carefully, efforts to co-produce climate
knowledge may amplify the voice of some at the expense of
others with different needs (Klenk and Meehan 2015).
The relationship between the state and science differs from
country to country. In the UK, scientific expertise and political
authority are separated to deliver objective and rational
knowledge to support pragmatic empiricist policy-making
(Mahony and Hulme 2016; Tangney 2016; Rothstein et al.
2013; Jasanoff 2005). Yet, this same expertise is often funded
by UK government departments with their own agendas
(Tangney 2016; Steynor et al. 2012). Other countries have
very different set-ups. Neither Switzerland nor the
Netherlands has a majority government. Decisions have to
be consensual. Otherwise, nothing proceeds. Inclusion of the
political, scientific, public and private minorities is common.
It has been argued that compromises can be found easier
through a closed nature of inclusion and a lack of transparency
in how decisions are made, as actors are able to negotiate (and
concede) without public scrutiny (Hermann et al. 2016;
Andeweg and Irwin 2005). Differences between Dutch and
Swiss political cultures do exist, though. In the Netherlands,
the policy-making process is more participatory in that it in-
cludes political elites, interest groups and individual citizens
(Andeweg and Irwin 2005; van der Brugge et al. 2005). In
Switzerland, by contrast, different representatives from poli-
tics, public administrations and interest groups mediate poli-
cies between themselves, with the Swiss electorate called on
to decide issues in referendums if a consensus cannot be
reached (Hermann et al. 2016).
In this paper, we seek to understand why climate scenarios
are produced differently from country to country by examin-
ing the social and scientific values that shape it. To do this, we
focus on the experiences of suppliers of climate information,
namely scientists and advisors, responsible for delivering cli-
mate scenarios whose voices are critical yet too often silent in
co-productionist studies (Cvitanovic et al. 2015). We per-
formed a comparative analysis of three countries—the
Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK—which share a number
of similarities in modelling capacities yet chose to design their
climate scenarios in very different ways. After explaining our
methods and data, we compare the modelling approaches,
institutional arrangements and climate information provided
in each country. We then investigate the different motivations
for producing climate scenarios, before we turn to the different
scientist–user interactions. To close, we develop a typology to
explain the differences in how and why the climate scenarios
took the particular shape they did.
Data and methods
To understand how climate scenarios are produced and, im-
portantly, why they differ from one country to another, we
adopted a case study approach to examine the recent efforts
of climate scientists in the Netherlands, Switzerland and the
UK. We chose these case studies because they share a number
of similarities and differences. Each country has a history of
developing climate scenarios, enjoys well-funded climate
programmes and makes use of state-of-the-art computing fa-
cilities and expertise, yet each differs in the modelling ap-
proaches taken and the degree to which users were involved.
To examine these case studies in greater depth, we brought
together the findings from two methods. First, we conducted a
desk-based search to identify documents (e.g. briefing reports,
technical summaries, guidance notes) relating to the release of
each set of climate scenarios. These documents provide a pub-
lic record as to why modelling decisions were taken, how
users participated in the process and the reasoning behind
different presentational styles in each country. A total of 37
documents were imported to MAXQDA—a qualitative cod-
ing software—and analysed (n = 12, KNMI’14; n = 13,
CH2011; n = 12, UKCP09). We then manually coded the
documents to identify emergent themes on a range of topics
from the treatment of uncertainty, involvement of users and
lessons learnt.
Second, we conducted semi-structured interviews (n = 10)
with climate scientists and advisors responsible for delivering
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the Dutch and Swiss climate scenarios during 2015/2016. We
supplemented this data with five interviews performed with
actors involved in the UK’s climate scenarios in mid-2013
(Porter and Dessai 2017).Whenever possible, interviews were
held face-to-face in participants’ offices or via Skype. We
adopted a conversational approach, which allowed people to
express their views and experiences on aspects of the produc-
tion process not covered in the official documentation we
analysed. To that end, we asked: Why are climate scenarios
needed? Who was involved in the production process, and
what role did they play? And, to what extent were users in-
volved, and what did they contribute? All the interviews were
digitally recorded (with consent) and transcribed using an in-
telligent verbatim transcription approach—omitting filler
words or hesitations (Hadley 2015). Once the transcripts were
imported into MAXQDA, we manually coded the responses
to identify emergent themes including modelling decisions,
user engagement and institutional relationships.
To introduce greater rigour to our findings, we triangulated
the codes from both datasets to understand where the greatest
agreement, or disagreements, existed.
Context: how do the British, Dutch and Swiss climate
scenarios compare?
Despite only a few years separating the release of the British,
Dutch and Swiss climate scenarios, they differ in a number of
ways (see Table 1). Briefly introducing each of the climate
scenarios below, we highlight how these differences are not
only concerned with the way climate change was assessed, or
the actors involved, but also how each country presents cli-
mate information.
UK’s climate scenarios: the UKCP09 land scenarios
After 7 years of work, the UK Met Office Hadley Centre
released the world’s first set of probabilistic climate scenarios:
the UKCP09 land scenarios,2 in 2009. This modelling endeav-
our was largely driven by the Met Office Hadley Centre,
whilst the UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) man-
aged the user engagement. Funded by the UK Government,
the climate scenarios serve as an ‘input to the difficult choices
that planners and other decision-makers will need to make, in
sectors such as transport, healthcare, water resources, and
coastal defences’ by giving users the freedom to choose the
scale, time period and thresholds corresponding to their risk
tolerance and appetite (Jenkins et al. 2009).
A major focus for UKCP09’s climate scenarios was its
effort to account for the inevitable uncertainty around future
climate change. Probability distribution functions are provid-
ed to indicate the plausible range of climate change under a
particular emission scenario—with an expression of how
strongly different outcomes are supported by different lines
of evidence (e.g. climate science, observations and expert
judgement) (see Fig. 1; Jenkins et al. 2009). For instance,
users can assess the likelihood that temperatures will increase
by more than 3 °C in London in the 2080s relative to the
1961–1990 base period. A large number of climate simula-
tions were run to capture structural model uncertainties, ac-
counting for different climate models’ ability to replicate key
aspects of current and future climate change. To do this, a
perturbed physics ensemble with the Met Office Hadley
Centre’s own climate model was combined with a multi-
model ensemble from other modelling centres through a novel
and complex (yet as a consequence somewhat contentious)
Bayesian approach that used a statistical climate model emu-
lator (see Frigg et al. 2015; Parker 2010).
The climate scenarios are given at a resolution of 25 km2
over land or as averages for administrative regions and river
basins. Confidence varies within the data, however. It is
highest at the continental scale and lowest at the local scale,
which interests users most (Porter and Dessai 2016). Users
can choose from seven time periods, with overlapping 30-
year windows spanning 2010 to 2099. Users, in turn, are also
encouraged to work with all three emission scenarios: high,
medium and low, to learn the full extent of possible changes
(Jenkins et al. 2009). The climate scenarios are available free
of charge via three formats: (1) key findings (headline mes-
sages, maps and graphs), (2) published materials (reports,
guidance and case studies for various sectors) and (3)
customisable outputs (raw data via the user interface website)
(Steynor et al. 2012). After the launch, there were updates to
the climate scenarios; for instance, spatially coherent
projections were provided so that users could combine results
from grid boxes to create spatial information.
Switzerland’s climate scenarios: CH2011
Released in 2011, the Swiss climate scenario CH2011 marked
the completion of a joint science-led initiative by the Institute
for Atmospheric and Climate Science at the Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH) and the Federal
Office for Meteorology and Climatology MeteoSwiss, with
contributions from the Center for Climate Systems Modeling
(C2SM, a research collaboration housed at ETH), the
National Centre of Competence in Research Climate
(NCCR Climate, a major Swiss research grant housed at the
University of Berne) and the Swiss Advisory Body on
Climate Change (OcCC, housed at the civil society organisa-
tion ProClim). CH2011 provides a new assessment detailing
2 UKCP09 included numerous distinct products, such as marine scenarios,
observed trends and a weather generator. We have analysed only the land
scenarios and refer to this product when we use the term ‘UKCP09’.
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Table 1 A broad comparison of British, Dutch and Swiss climate scenarios, 2009–2014
UK—UKCP09 land scenarios Switzerland—CH2011 Netherlands—KNMI’14
Previous national climate scenarios CCIRG91; CCIRG96; UKCIP98; UKCIP02 CH2007 Buishand and Tank 1996; WB21; KNMI’06;
2009 supplements to KNMI’06
Scientific bodies Met Office Hadley Centre (MOHC) Federal Office of Meteorology and Climatology
MeteoSwiss; Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology Zurich (ETH), Center for Climate
Systems Modeling (C2SM)
Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute
(KNMI)
Boundary organisations UK Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) ProClim Forum for Climate and Global Change None
Funders Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs (Defra); Department for Energy
and Climate Change (DECC)
ETH and MeteoSwiss through in-kind
contributions; smaller financial contributions
by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy
(SFOE); Federal Office for the Environment
(FOEN); through C2SM by Empa, Agroscope
Reckenholz-Tänikon, ETH Zurich
Foundation
Ministry of Infrastructure
and the Environment
Advisory bodies Steering Group (strategic: MOHC andDefra);
Project Management Group (operational:
MOHC); User Panel (consultative:
UKCIP)
Coordination Group (strategic and advisory) International Advisory
Board (8 scientific members from other
European climate research institutions)
Review Process Method reviewed by International Review
Group with 6 members from the UK, the
USA and Canada (UKCP09 (Review
Group 2009)), reports reviewed by user
panel members
Report reviewed by climate scientists (11 named
+ anonymous). Methods and models had
already been published or were in press with
academic journals (Buser et al. 2009; Fischer
et al. 2011)
Internal review from the
Advisory Board with the methods published
in an academic journal (Lenderink et al.
2014), summary report reviewed by selected
users
Emission scenarios used 3 emission scenarios (A1F1, A1B and B1) 3 emission scenarios (A1B, A2 and RCP3PD) 4 (2 driving variables: global
temp and air circulation; 2 conditions: high or
low)
Ensemble Perturbed physics ensemble (PPE);
multi-model ensemble (MME)
MME Initial state perturbation for 8 EC-Earth
integrations; MME
Data source 280 global climate model (GCM) runs with
HadSM3; 13 GCM HadCM3 runs; 11
regional climate model (RCM) HadRM3
variants
8 GCMs; RCMs from ENSEMBLES: n = 20 up
to 2050; n = 14 up to 2100; n = 10 for the
daily data for meteorological stations up to
2100
Downscaling of 8 EC-Earth GCM runs with
RACMO2 RCM; 250 GCM calculations of
Coupled Model Intercomparison Project
Phase 5 (CMIP5)
Regional differentiation 25-km2 grid cells (434 selectable land grid
squares); 23 river-basin regions; 16
administrative regions
Averaged over 3 regions (without the Alpine
region)
None; apart from a qualitative differentiation for
temperature
Time horizons 2020s, 2050s and 2080s available as monthly,
seasonal and annual 30-year means/
probabilities (daily and hourly via the
weather generator)
2020–2049, 2045–2074 and 2070–2099
available as seasonal ranges (daily via raw
data)
2030s (combining all 4 scenarios), 2050s and
2080s available at seasonal and annual ranges,
daily via raw data
Climate variables 25 (e.g. temperature, precipitation, sea-level
rise; cloudiness; solar radiation)
10 (n = 2 quantitative: temperature and
precipitation; n = 8 qualitative: summer heat
waves, intense rainfall, droughts, etc.)
12 (e.g. temperature, precipitation, sea-level rise,
fog) stated as 22 indicators (e.g. mean, daily
maximum, number of days ≥20 mm)
Electronic resources User interface website with a visualiser;
product reports (e.g. marine, land,
observations, weather generator; n = 518
pages)
Website to download climate scenario reports
(e.g. summary and scientific, n = 94 pages),
raw data and subsequently provided
extensions (no user interface)
Website to download scenario reports (e.g.
brochure and scientific; n = 156 pages) and
raw data with all indicators at station scale (no
user interface)
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how Switzerland’s climate may change over the next century.
Delivered without a mandate but officially sanctioned once
completed,3 the climate scenarios provide a ‘coherent’ basis
to develop ‘climate change impact studies… addressing eco-
logic, economic, and social’ consequences to inform ‘climate
adaptation and mitigation strategies’ (CH2011 2011).
CH2011 climate scenarios are ‘based on a new generation
of global and European-scale regional climate models’
(CH2011 2011). Switzerland does not have its own global
climate model, but ETH contributed to the regional climate
modelling COSMO-CLM community project. This means
CH2011’s ‘model data have been provided by several inter-
national projects’ instead (CH2011 2011). Climate simula-
tions from the ENSEMBLES project (van der Linden and
Mitchell 2009), as well as studies and assessments from the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), were
used. New, but importantly peer-reviewed, statistical methods
were used to generate multi-model ensemble estimates of
changes and associated uncertainties. Probability statements
as in the IPCC (i.e. likely indicating at least two in three
chances of the value falling in the given range), but no
PDFs, are assigned to temperature and precipitation only, un-
der three emission scenarios (two non-intervention and one
climate stabilisation) to give users an indication of the likely
direction of change (e.g. summer rainfall likely to decrease by
6–23% for 2060 in the western part of Switzerland in the A2
scenario) (CH2011 2011).
The climate scenarios were aggregated spatially into three
broad regions with much of the Alps excluded, as its topo-
graphical complexity raised concerns over how to reliably
interpret the model results (CH2011 2011). Projected changes
over the twenty-first century are broken into three time periods
(2020–2049, 2045–2074 and 2070–2099) and are available as
seasonal and daily ranges. The CH2011 climate scenarios can
be accessed freely for research, education and commercial
purposes, by visiting the website and downloading the indi-
vidual datasets (e.g. regional scenarios at daily resolution) or
by requesting the published reports for the main findings.
Following the release of CH2011, two extensions were pub-
lished, providing annual averages, climate scenarios for the
Alpine region and station-scale daily data for all three emis-
sion scenarios.
Netherlands’ climate scenarios: KNMI’14
The Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI) is-
sued the country’s most recent climate scenarios in 2014:
KNMI’14. Funded by the government, the climate scenarios
‘will be used [by decision makers] to map the impacts of
climate change… [and] evaluate the importance and the ur-
gency of climate adaptation measures’ for building coastal
defences, healthcare, city planning and nature conservation
(KNMI 2014b).
A defining feature of KNMI’14 is the use of four scenarios
to visualise how future climate may change around 2050 and
2085 (see Fig. 1). Each scenario differs in terms of the amount
of global warming (moderate or warm) and possible changes
in air circulation (low or high). Around 2085 (2071–2100),
under the GL scenario (low air circulation change, low global
temperature rise), annual mean temperature is projected to be
1.3 °C warmer than the reference period (1981–2010) where-
as, under the WH scenario (high air circulation change, high
global temperature rise), it could be 3.7 °C warmer. To obtain
a range (e.g. for summer daily maximum extremes),
KNMI’14 provides the currently observed natural variability
onto which users can superimpose the future climate change
signal to derive future upper and lower bounds. These scenar-
ios show a single spatial scale: the whole of the Netherlands.
This is because ‘any attempt to make climate predictions at a
relatively small spatial scale such as the Netherlands or even
Western Europe for multiple decades ahead cannot be expect-
ed to lead to skilful results’ (KNMI 2014b).
Eight initial-state perturbed climate simulations with the
community global climate model EC-Earth (co-supported by
the Dutch) and their own regional climate model RACMO2
were performed. These were then supplemented with a multi-
model ensemble from the Coupled Model Intercomparison
Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) (WCRP 2010). Users are able to
access the KNMI’14 climate scenarios free of charge by
downloading the published reports or requesting the dataset
directly from KNMI. After KNMI’14 was published, an in-
consistency in the WL scenario for 2085 was found which
prompted KNMI to issue a rectified version in late 2015.
Key differences between the British, Swiss and Dutch
climate scenarios
We found four key differences in how the British, Dutch and
Swiss scientists approached the production and dissemination
of their climate scenarios. Simply put, these differences in-
clude (i) modelling capacities, (ii) treatment and communica-
tion of uncertainty, (iii) the actors involved and (iv) access to
the data.
First, whereas the British and Dutch have their own climate
models, the Swiss rely on utilising modelling efforts of others.
In turn, the British climate scenarios took a more
3 Government approval played a key role in all three national climate scenarios
we studied. Such approval represented national governments’ commitment to
make as many people aware of climate change as possible and the need for
them to take action. It also symbolised the commitment of scientists to make a
difference to society by ensuring their work informed decision-making.
Whereas UKCP09 and KNMI’14 emerged from pre-existing government-
sponsored contracts, CH2011 was driven by scientists themselves and was
only given a government approval prior to publication as it tied into wider
political objectives including the Swiss Federal Councils’ strategy on climate
adaptation.
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computationally demanding and complex modelling ap-
proach than its counterparts. Second, this gave rise to the
British incorporating the structural model error explicitly,
with the help of a Bayesian statistical model. This inclusion
of model uncertainties broadens the spread of model simu-
lations, which they communicated as PDFs for each emis-
sion scenario. In theory, the PDFs incorporate the expert
judgment needed to interpret the information correctly. The
Swiss and Dutch followed the IPCC approach whereby in-
terpretation and use of model results need expert judgement.
But, they did so differently. The Swiss used Bayesian statis-
tics to estimate PDFs but communicated only a lower, me-
dium and upper value as representative plausible outcomes
for each emission scenario. Because of the Netherlands’
high vulnerability to coastal flooding and the profound im-
plications on most national activities, changes in wind direc-
tion have been judged as an additional key uncertainty.
Coastal defences, among other adaptation options, need to
incorporate both increased storm surges due to wind as well
as sea-level rise due to emission scenarios. To incorporate
this, the Dutch assessed and communicated their uncer-
tainties along these two dimensions, providing single figures
for each of the four storylines.
Third, the Dutch kept the entire modelling and user engage-
ment within a single organisation: KNMI, whilst the British
and Swiss included various, institutionally distinct and phys-
ically distant, actors for these tasks. For instance, the CH2011
community comprised multiple institutions, with some scien-
tists asked to represent the views of multiple actors (and users)
simultaneously. Lastly, although the British provide users with
all the output data and guidance on potential limitations, the
Dutch and Swiss restricted what information users received.
The Swiss withheld parts of the data relating to the Alps due
its topographical complexity and the Dutch aggregated the
data into two driving variables, air circulation change and
temperature. These different epistemological preferences af-
fect the reasoning behind how climate scenarios are done in
the first place.
What is the purpose of climate scenarios?
Twomain reasons were cited by all three sets of scientists as to
why they felt it was important to produce and disseminate
climate scenarios. First, in order to take well-informed adap-
tation and mitigation decisions, a single coherent body of lo-
cally relevant scientific information is needed. Second, such
exercises can help advance scientific understanding through
the development of new methods, computing power and
working relationships. Although the three case studies share
these two objectives, our research suggests that they were
prioritised, understood and acted upon differently.
Informing climate adaptation and mitigation
decision-making
All interviewed climate scientists agreed that their country
needed its own set of climate scenarios because decision-
makers are primarily ‘interested in their local patch’
(UKCP09 scientist 5) and because weather patterns are differ-
ent from one place to another (KNMI’14 scientist 1). The
IPCC assessment reports and its regional climate scenario
chapter (Christensen et al. 2007) are simply ‘too coarse’ to
inform local or sector-based adaptation decision-making
(CH2011 scientist 2).
A growing user base, with evolving requirements, has also
led to ‘many requests for additional information and guidance’
such as the inclusion of more climate variables, extreme
weather events and regional details that larger-scale climate
scenarios cannot provide (KNMI 2014b). Servicing the infor-
mational needs of these users is a major purpose of climate
scenarios. All the scientists shared this conviction and went to
great lengths to stress how they wanted their work not only to
be ‘useful’ to decision-makers but also importantly ‘used’ by
them (CH2011 scientist 4).
National policies added further support for use-inspired
science. All three countries have enacted legislation requiring
climate scenarios to inform national-scale policy-making as
well as local-scale decision-making in public and private or-
ganisations. Only in Switzerland have climate scenarios
emerged without a governmental mandate (only to be official-
ly approved prior to publication) (CH2011 scientist 2). Yet, in
each case, efforts to co-produce climate scenarios have been
skewed in favour of scientists who retained power over ‘what
these scenarios look like’ or ‘when to provide these scenarios’
(KNMI’14 advisor 1).
Another key purpose of climate scenarios for KNMI scien-
tists was to initiate a ‘paradigm shift’ in how users think
(KNMI 2014b). Moving away from responses based on expe-
riences of ‘past climatic events’, users should instead antici-
pate ‘possible future conditions’ for decisions today (KNMI
2014b). UKCP09 scientists also felt that climate scenarios
helped reaffirm the different roles and responsibilities of those
involved in adaptation decision-making:
It’s not the climate scientist’s responsibility to provide a
golden number [for users] and accept that risk [for it].
Because [scientists] can only provide what is the best
science at the time, and make all the uncertainties avail-
able before saying ‘Okay, this is our best estimate, so
take from that what you can’. And then it’s over to users
as to how they use it (UKCP09 advisor 1).
Some users may, however, struggle with this epistemolog-
ical position. Users may become frustrated or confused if they
identify and manage their risks differently to how the climate
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scenarios have prescribed them, especially if they prefer to
work with single figures rather than a range (or PDFs). As
Porter and Dessai (2017) argue, UKCP09 scientists often see
users as miniature versions of themselves—mini-mes—who
struggle to understand why anyone would not want to use
probabilistic information, which, for them, represents the best
science available. This can lead to tensions when users who
‘rely on a definitive answer being provided for them’ fail to
receive one (UKCP09 advisor 1). By contrast, KNMI’14
scientists felt one of the main purposes of climate scenarios
was to engage as many people, from different backgrounds
with different interests, as possible so as to actively avoid
giving users multiple, perhaps conflicting, outputs
(KNMI’14 scientist 2). For each variable, users were given
only a single figure (average) for its four scenarios. That is,
for a variable of interest, users must compare four averages
(one for each of the four scenarios) in order to see if there are
differences or trends, and their size, between the four
Fig. 1 Comparison of the visuals
of the British, Swiss and Dutch
climate scenarios, 2009–2014.
Top CH2011 divides Switzerland
into three climatic areas with
corresponding seasonal ranges for
three future time periods. The
example shows temperature
changes under emission scenario
A2. Middle KNMI’14 only
visualises winter and summer
temperature and precipitation
changes to increase legibility,
combining all four scenarios with
three historical averages. Data for
autumn, spring and the natural
variability are available only
through a table. Bottom UKCP09
visualises likely changes as
probability density functions
(PDFs) for each of the three
emission scenarios. This graph
holds no temporal information—
for each of the climate variables,
time periods, grid points and
regions, such a graph is available
online. The example indicates
changes in summer-mean daily
maximum temperature in South
East England for the 2080s
(sources: CH2011 2011; KNMI
2014a; Jenkins et al. 2009)
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scenarios. This was less likely to be misinterpreted or cause
confusion; it is argued (KNMI 2014b).
Advancing scientific knowledge
One, if not the main, driver for developing each set of climate
scenarios was the opportunity to advance scientific knowl-
edge. However, the three groups of scientists interpreted their
intellectual contribution differently. For instance, KMNI’14
and CH2011 aimed to improve and consolidate the range of
scientific information used in decision-making for their re-
spective countries (CH2011 scientist 4), whereas the
UKCP09 climate scenarios wanted to develop a ‘new method
for quantifying uncertainty’ with international reach too
(UKCP09 scientist 2).
Newly developed methods, improved computing power
and recently released model runs (e.g. CMIP5), alongside
the availability of new observation datasets, were all cited as
reasons for producing climate scenarios. For KNMI’14 scien-
tists, advances in climate modelling opened up a new dialogue
with users including water managers and health specialists
over ‘what could or couldn’t be done’, so that users helped
prioritise the scientific work (KNMI’14 scientist 2). It also
allowed KNMI’14 scientists to test if the predecessor,
KNMI’06, underestimated the impact of air circulation pat-
terns on temperature rise (KNMI 2014b). Interestingly,
KNMI’14 scientists were ‘a little disappointed with the final
result [due to] the similarity of the outcomes’ between
KNMI’06 and KNMI’14 (KNMI’14 scientist 1). Whilst
KNMI’14 scientists reiterated their primary goal to improve
the usability and use of the climate scenarios, the satisfaction
derived from being the first to discover some scientific novelty
is still important. Researchers’ desire to advance scientific
knowledge about climate and explore new ways of thinking
about climate decisions (probabilities), it seems, can conflict
with the more pragmatic needs of users (i.e. highly robust
information presented in familiar ways) to enable effective
adaptation planning. Therefore, the extent to which co-
production will help to resolve these tensions or exacerbate
them further as those involved in the supplying and demand-
ing climate information became more frustrated with each
other is unclear.
For CH2011 scientists, the need to advance scientific un-
derstanding via a new set of climate scenarios was expressed
differently. Already serving as IPCC lead authors but lacking
the modelling resources enjoyed by other countries
(Brönnimann et al. 2014), the CH2011 climate scenarios
strengthened old and encouraged new collaborations between
Swiss research institutions (CH2011 advisor 1). It brought
researchers and (scientific) users ‘to one table’ where every-
one could discuss how the modelling should be done
(CH2011 scientist 4). ‘There wasn’t always a consensus with-
in the group’ because the complex topography of the Swiss
Alps presents challenges for modelling. But, by ‘bringing to-
gether the different institutions’, the Swiss climate science
community was able to speak with ‘one voice’ for the first
time and created the momentum to fund future climate scenar-
ios, as well as political support to establish the Swiss National
Centre for Climate Services (CH2011 scientist 4).
UKCP09 scientists differ from their KNMI’14 and
CH2011 counterparts in how they understand and, in turn,
acted upon the need to both advance scientific knowledge
and inform adaptation decision-making. For KNMI’14 and
CH2011 scientists, the two objectives can sometimes be in-
compatible whereas UKCP09 scientists felt that they went
hand-in-hand. UKCP09 scientists assumed that if users want
to make ‘reliable, robust, and relevant’ decisions, ‘they need
the best science’ available (UKCP09 scientist 3). Better sci-
ence, it seems, equals better decisions (see Porter and Dessai
2017). What constitutes good science for decision-making for
the British and Dutch scientists is understood differently, how-
ever. In contrast to the single figures provided in KNMI’14,
UKCP09 quantifies climate variables’ ranges so that users can
decide about the level of risk they want to manage. Where
multi-model ensembles have conventionally been used to as-
sess uncertainty, UKCP09 scientists felt this method failed to
capture the full range of uncertainties (Porter and Dessai
2016). By developing their own method, not only would they
make a significant intellectual contribution to quantifying
model uncertainties but they could also meet the institution-
al–political goals set by the Met Office, the Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and the now
disbanded Department of Energy and Climate Change
(DECC) to produce world-leading science, with the potential
to influence the IPCC process (UKCP09 scientist 2).
Different understandings, different priorities
All three sets of scientists were fully committed to informing
adaptation decisions and advancing scientific understandings
yet interpreted these commitments differently. For CH2011
scientists, priority was given to assembling a consistent evi-
dence base that spoke with one voice. To do this, the effort
was focused on improving working relationships and intellec-
tual exchanges to advance scientific capacities. For KNMI’14
scientists, a major driver was the need to change how people
think and act in relation to climate change. Advances in cli-
mate modelling certainly aided this process but were not the
sole catalyst. For UKCP09 scientists, efforts to quantify un-
certainty were underpinned by the assumption that users need
the best science possible. Practical or application-based con-
siderations inevitably took a backseat to intellectual contribu-
tions and the pursuit of curiosity-driven science. These differ-
ent understandings of the purpose of climate scenarios affect
the way users are involved in the process and the extent to
which they are listened to.
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How involved did scientists think users were
in producing the climate scenarios?
Our research suggests that all three sets of climate scenarios
differed considerably in the extent to which they involved
users, what they expected them to contribute and even whom
they thought the user was in the first place. Together, these
differences have had a marked effect on the particular form
taken by the British, Dutch and Swiss climate scenarios. For
instance, how model uncertainty was quantified (cf. UKCP09
vs. KMNI’14) is based on a series of assumptions about the
capacity of users to work through and make sense of complex
information. However, narrowly defined perceptions of users
and their needs have seriously diluted the stated commitment
to co-produce national climate scenarios.
Scientists’ perceptions of users
Without exception, the official documents issued for all three
sets of climate scenarios paint a very broad picture of potential
users. From actors interested in digging down and exploring
the data to those interested only in the headline messages, the
scientists hoped that their climate scenarios will be used by the
widest audience possible. In other words, the climate scenar-
ios should not become the exclusive preserve of a small group
of actors. This manifests itself differently in each country.
Where the KNMI’14 and CH2011 climate scenarios aimed
to inform decisions in sectors from water, healthcare, agricul-
ture and transport to infrastructure, UKCP09 went even fur-
ther by subdividing the users within these sectors into three
categories: researchers, decision-makers and communicators
(Steynor et al. 2012). Simply put, all three climate scenarios
should officially cater to different users, all with different
needs.
Few of the scientists interviewed shared that view, howev-
er. CH2011 scientists, for instance, felt the end users would be
either impact modellers or government officials (CH2011 sci-
entist 1). Previous experiences from the last climate scenarios,
CH2007, and the government agenda to develop a national
adaptation strategy, informed this view. Yet, misunderstand-
ings over what users need and what scientists think is useful
(see Lemos et al. 2012) soon developed. CH2011 scientists
realised they had ‘produced far more information than [gov-
ernment officials] could use’ or make sense of (CH2011 sci-
entist 1). Lacking the time and resources to work through the
probability statements provided, government officials were
forced to simplify the climate information they used. A ‘user
bubble’ of likeminded individuals—impact modellers—
consulted by the CH2011 scientists meant they had, uninten-
tionally, overestimated the capacity of non-quantitative users
(Liniger 2015). Upon reflection, CH2011 scientists told us
that while it was fairly intuitive to identify which sectors might
be interested in using climate scenarios, it remained a mystery
how the climate scenarios would actually be used or what
users needed from them (CH2011 scientist 3).
UKCP09 scientists, similarly, were confident that they
‘knew what users needed’ (UKCP09 scientist 1). With over
25 years of experience developing climate scenarios (e.g.
LINK project, CCIRG, UKCIP), scientists had formed close
working relationships with several users: impact modellers,
water managers and consultants (Porter and Dessai 2017,
2016; Hulme and Dessai 2008). All of these users share cer-
tain characteristics. They are highly numerate, motivated and
knowledgeable actors. These characteristics were woven into
the fabric of the new climate scenarios. That is, UKCP09
requires users to have already assessed their vulnerability to
climate change themselves to be able to use PDFs (Jenkins
et al. 2009). A persistent criticism, though, is that potential
users without the time, resources or capacity to make sense
of their vulnerabilities can find themselves excluded (Frigg
et al. 2015; Tang and Dessai 2012). Indeed, UKCP09 scien-
tists were warned against defining the user too narrowly
(Steynor et al. 2012). Very late in the process, the government
funder, Defra, pushed for the climate scenarios to be opened
up to ‘as many people as possible’ to avoid satisfying only a
single type of user (UKCP09 scientist 2).
KNMI’14 scientists did things differently. They already
knew water managers were the primary user of the previous
climate scenarios, KNMI’06 (KNMI’14 scientist 1). Unlike
their CH2011 or UKCP09 counterparts, ‘the first meeting of
the [KNMI’14] project team was on user requirements’
(KNMI’14 advisor 1). Put differently, KNMI’14 scientists be-
lieve that limiting the volume of (undigested) information giv-
en to users, and the choices they have to make, improves the
accessibility and understanding of the climate scenarios.
Asking users to focus on four storylines places less demands
on their time and requires only a basic level of understanding,
initially at least. KNMI’14 scientists, therefore, imagined dif-
ferent users with different needs and capacities (KNMI’14
scientist 2).
Scientists’ perceptions of user interactions
Despite initial reluctance from some scientists to involve the
intended and favoured users, by the end, a closer working
relationship between the two became highly valued.
Scientists concerned over lack of time or the right skills to
engage with favoured users soon realised that with a better
understanding of how climate information is used, and therein
what users need, they could make a ‘few small changes with
immediate impact’ (UKCP09 scientist 1). The only way to do
this was for scientists and users to meet face-to-face, some-
thing the UK has been doing since the early 1990s (see Hulme
and Dessai 2008). Yet, all three sets of climate scientists held
very different views on the interaction format and the extent to
which users were listened to.
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CH2011 scientists told us that users ‘weren’t involved as
much as they would have liked’ (CH2011 scientist 1). Both a
lack of ‘funding’ and official ‘mandate’ was cited as major bar-
riers (CH2011 scientist 2). Efforts were made to ensure the voice
of users was heard, nonetheless, although ‘we didn’t do a full
user survey… [canvassing only impact modellers] we still had a
good impression [of]…what users needed’ (CH2011 scientist 4).
Moreover, when a coordination group was set up to oversee the
production of the climate scenarios, two of the six seats were
filled by user representatives. Mirroring the political culture of
Swiss collegiality, the coordination group required members to
reach decisions collectively. Yet, it was not always easy for user
representatives to relay the ‘heterogeneous needs’ of users
(CH2011 advisor 1). As a consequence, this institutionalised
the user bubble rather than challenged it (Liniger 2015). Users
were only introduced en masse just ‘before the report was re-
leased’where ‘talks and events’were held so that everyone ‘who
should know about [the climate scenarios] did know about them
in advance’ (CH2011 scientist 4). However, not only is aware-
ness different from engagement, but the introduction of users at
such a late stage restricts what they can, and are willing to,
contribute and articulate.
KNMI’14 and UKCP09 scientists both conducted surveys
with users from previous versions of their climate scenarios
and ran workshops to understand how user needs have
changed. A long ‘shopping list’ of requirements was identified
but was interpreted and acted upon differently. For instance,
the ‘explicit presentation of [model] uncertainties and assump-
tions behind [them], easier access [to the data], and higher
temporal and spatial resolution [data]’ was flagged by both
projects (Steynor et al. 2012; see also Bessembinder et al.
2011). Whereas this confirmed UKCP09 scientists’ need to
advance science linearly (UKCP09 scientist 1), KNMI’14 sci-
entists felt a closer dialogue was needed to dispel the ‘you ask,
we deliver’ paradigm in the hope that users reconsider their
requests (KNMI’14 scientist 3). Indeed, KNMI’14 scientists
raised concerns about the methods to elicit user needs. For
them, surveys risk closing down fruitful conversations about
user needs, and therein, fail to understand how, or why, users
actually use climate information:
You cannot just go to users once and ask them for feed-
back. You need to have regular contact, continuous con-
tact, over a long time to get really useful feedback. It’s
not just asking ‘what do you want?’ and then giving it to
them… many users want to do something with climate
adaptation but don’t know exactly what that is or how to
do it… so it’s important to know how they use climate
data (KNMI’14 advisor 2).
To encourage as much interaction as possible, many
face-to-face meetings between scientists and users were
organised (KNMI’14 advisor 2). Two communication
experts were hired to get users more involved instead of
‘just listening to talks’ (KNMI’14 scientist 2). ‘Light
workshops with standing tables’ mixing scientists and
users with ‘only six people around each table… to make
it easy to ask questions’ were used (KNMI’14 advisor 2).
This set-up helped scientists to better understand how cli-
mate information is used and, in turn, what users need. It
also opened up conversations over ‘the advantages and
disadvantages of probability distributions and the way un-
certainties are presented’ and differences between what is
doable and what is desirable by getting users to think
more re f lex ive ly about ‘ the i r l i s t o f reques t s ’
(Bessembinder et al. 2011). ‘That discussion and dialogue
between users and KNMI staff really was the main con-
tribution of the three years of work. Much more so than
the analysis of the data and the climate scenarios’
(KNMI’14 scientist 2).
UKCP09 scientists, by contrast, were less enthusiastic
about interacting with users than their KNMI’14 counter-
parts. That reluctance was due, in part, to different ideas
about the roles and responsibilities of scientists (Porter
and Dessai 2017). As Mahony and Hulme (2016) observe,
UKCP09 scientists saw their job as pushing the bound-
aries of climate modelling and solving practical problems
to inform governmental policy and decision-making,
while organisations like UKCIP should engage users be-
cause they possess the ‘right skills and time’ to do so
(UKCP09 scientist 2). Part of the British political culture
of evidence-based decision-making serves to reinforce
this separation of scientists and users, in order to preserve
the integrity and authority of expert knowledge, on the
one hand, and a top–down hierarchy between the two is
maintained, on the other (Tangney and Howes 2016). That
said, 3 years after the modelling began, the UKCP09 pro-
ject was reorganised, and UKCIP’s idea of bringing users
and scientists together via a user panel was achieved with
the support of the funder, Defra (UKCIP 2006). Practical
concerns were raised, such as the number of users in-
volved, how regularly (or when) to consult them and
how to weigh their contributions equally. For instance,
there is the risk that ‘users who [are] able to eloquently
express their needs or regularly attended meetings’ gain
greater attention or have ‘undue influence’ on the output
of the user panel (Steynor et al. 2012). Yet, user input for
the climate scenarios was highly constrained. Modelling
decisions had gone beyond the point of being reversed
(cf. Corner et al. 2012). Users were left to comment on
‘presentation issues’ over the spatial aggregation of the
outputs (e.g. 25-km2 grid cells vs. river basins) rather than
discussing how to model uncertainty differently (UKCP09
advisor 2). The lecture-like set-up with ‘talk after talk’
focused on selling the climate scenarios to users
(UKCP09 scientist 2).
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Doing things together
The motivation, intensity and format of the scientist–user in-
teraction were different across the three countries. The ‘you
ask, we deliver’ paradigm was used strategically in UKCP09
to support their scientific work but dispelled by KNMI as they
felt that a discussion on how climate data is used was more
fruitful. In addition, the timing was problematic for both the
British and Swiss climate scenarios. Users engaged with
UKCP09 only after the major decisions have already been
taken (and the funder Defra stepped in), and in CH2011, the
interaction was confined to awareness. At best, this limits
what contributions users can make, and at worst, it can lead
to frustration and disengagement.
This limited interaction was partly accepted because British
and Swiss scientists felt they knew who the user was. In the
Swiss case, this happened through official channels between
federal offices or past research collaborations. In the UK, the
Met Office had been working with users alongside UKCIP
since 1997, so UKCP09 scientists felt that they had already
developed considerable (tacit and explicit) knowledge of
users. Yet, the users that UKCIP formally introduced to the
Met Office often asked highly technical questions that UKCIP
could not answer itself. That filtering process (unintentionally)
skewed how Met Office scientists saw users (Porter and
Dessai 2017). This only confirmed what UKCP09 scientists
thought users wanted. In both the Swiss and British cases, an
early and broader user engagement might have flagged up
some warning signs over what scientists thought users needed
and what users wanted. For KNMI’14 scientists, the shift in
water management practices was only the starting point. It
served to question preconceptions of users in other sectors
too and avoid falling prey to confirmation bias.
Discussion
Our comparative analysis reveals that climate scenarios are
strongly influenced by the civic epistemology of each country,
which defines who has a say, what roles scientists and users
should play and how the two interact. Internal disagreements
on methodological aspects, communication and target users
exist but are often masked by the prevailing science–society
relations.
As shown in Table 2, what constitutes good science for
decision-making is understood differently from one country
to the next: consolidator (CH2011), innovator (UKCP09) and
collaborator (KNMI’14). Simply put, the Swiss are more con-
servative. They emphasise the need for tried-and-tested
methods that have been peer-reviewed (e.g. scientific consen-
sus) whereas the British were more adventurous. They applied
a new, largely untested, method for quantifying model uncer-
tainties on the assumption that users need this information to
adapt effectively (Porter and Dessai 2017). The Dutch have
mixed established methods with novel ones when culturally
acceptable (Enserink et al. 2013; van der Brugge et al. 2005;
see also Dilling and Berggren 2015). A major concern here is
when a mismatch develops between what makes science good
for decision-making in the eyes of scientists compared to what
makes science good for decision-making for the more prag-
matic needs of users. For instance, UKCP09 was too complex
for some users (Tang and Dessai 2012) and too bold for some
scientists (Frigg et al. 2015), which has impeded its uptake
and use.
Our ‘typology of use-inspired research’, shown in Table 2,
also develops other social science work on the values and
assumptions that shape atmospheric science. For Shackley
(2001), climate modelling centres judge good scientific prac-
tice differently in response to different institutional–political
priorities. A modelling hierarchy can emerge where greater
modelling complexity is assumed to provide greater realism
and better decision-making (Mahony and Hulme 2016;
Shackley et al. 1998; Shackley and Wynne 1995). While
UKCP09 has gone down the modelling complexity route,
CH2011 and KNMI’14 question what value is added by this.
All three climate scenarios differ considerably in how users
were engaged, which speaks to different types of user–scien-
tist interaction (Table 2): participation (KNMI’14), elicitation
(UKCP09) and representation (CH2011). While the Dutch
KNMI involved a large number of users in the production
process, the British and Swiss limited interactions to retain
power over production. Knowingly or not, science is socially
responsive. Different funding mechanisms, institutional ar-
rangements, epistemic cultures and preferences to risk affect
what knowledge is produced (by whom and how it is used).
This develops Jasanoff’s (2005) civic epistemology work that
climate science comes to reflect wider societal concerns
expressed through national politics (e.g. Swiss consensus
building, Dutch inclusiveness and UK expert authority; see
also Beck 2012).
Our two proposed typologies bring a much needed socio-
political context into the ‘knowledge systems’ framework by
Cash et al. (2003). Where the ‘typology of scientific enter-
prise’ characterises how judgements of good science give rise
to credible information, the ‘typology of user interaction’ ex-
plains what is involved in producing legitimate knowledge for
decision-making. Through the culturally situated production
of climate information, the scientific output is expected to be
salient (i.e. relevant) for governmental decision-making—a
key argument of the civic epistemologies (Jasanoff 2005).
Relevance and usability of scientific information are not
synonyms, however. Lemos et al. (2012) argue that usability
is high when information is tailored to needs and capacities of
users, a quality achieved through co-production where scien-
tists listen to users and respond to their needs. Our results
support this proposition: UKCP09 only included sophisticated
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and numerate members in their user panel while KNMI’14
included a broad user base. The climate scenarios from both
countries essentially served only the users involved in their
(co-)production.
We conclude, therefore, that several future discussions are
needed to better understand the different cultures for produc-
ing climate information. First, funders and scholars who ad-
vocate for scientists to co-produce climate information with
users need to be sensitive to, and reflect upon, the existing
social and political cultures that shape climate information.
Generalising case studies into best practices or one-size-fits-
all lists disregard the cultural sensitivities, which influence the
successful uptake of climate information (Webber 2015).
Second, further research is needed on the role government-
approved climate information plays in narrowing the usability
gap. Civic epistemologies profoundly influence how usable
climate information is constructed by both scientists and users.
Can political cultures similar to the UK produce knowledge
that serves a larger user base with different capacities—but
still be salient for government policy-making? What chal-
lenges does this present? And, how do users with simpler
needs judge the credibility and legitimacy of salient knowl-
edge, in the absence of governmental approval?
Third, the growing number of climate knowledge pro-
viders, brokers and specialists has led to calls for increased
harmonisation of modelling methods, climate variables and
climate service institutions across Europe. Although this
promises greater consistency and comparability, as well as
lower financial costs, many national governments are ‘keen
on exercising and strengthening their own epistemic sover-
eignty’ rather than offloading power to supra-national climate
service institutions (Mahony and Hulme 2016). It is unclear
howwell European climate knowledge practices would travel,
particularly if they ignore the national civic epistemologies
governing the interactions between science and society.
Considerable institutional inertia exists to keep doing climate
scenarios in the same way. Only the British radically changed
their way it produced and communicated its climate scenarios
between its last and most recent set, as Met Office Hadley
Centre scientists pushed for greater innovation in its climate
modelling. Whether the ‘Europeanisation’ of climate knowl-
edge is possible or even undesirable remains open to debate
(see Demeritt et al. 2013). Lastly, more research is needed to
reconcile the contrasting experiences of scientists and users to
better understand why good science is constructed differently
and the implications this has. For instance, after consulting
seemingly the same water users, why did UKCP09 and
KMNI’14 scientists take radically different approaches to their
climate scenarios? Different epistemic cultures alone cannot
fully explain this. Indeed, user preferences over risk, politics
and decision-making are powerful catalysts as well. Only by
tracing the experiences of scientists and users together will we
be able to fully understand what shapes climate information.Ta
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Conclusion
Our research maps how different social and scientific values,
and different institutional arrangements, shaped three sets of
national climate scenarios. What knowledge is produced, how
scientists and users interact and what the user expected to
apply the climate scenarios are strongly influenced by the
political culture of each country and the respective roles
played by science, government and non-state organisations
in each. Efforts to co-produce climate knowledge are restrict-
ed, possibly even counter-productive, if scientists are unwill-
ing to listen to users in the first place. And, while new actors
may join or user needs develop, producers and brokers of
climate information need to be aware of, and responsive to,
the political culture that incentivises such changes. While
government-approved science may help improve the legitima-
cy and credibility of climate information, the same is not nec-
essarily true for its saliency and usability. This insight has
important implications for how societies will adapt to climate
change and the extent to which their decisions will be
effective.
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